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Abstract 
China has been widely accused of deliberately maintaining an undervalued currency to 
fuel its exports. In this paper we argue that one of the most popular measures of 
equilibrium exchange rates, the Big Mac index, should make way for an Apple index; a 
theoretically more appealing index where purchasing power parity exchange rates are 
calculated based on the prices of globally available Apple Inc. products such as the iMac 
and iPod. Our Apple index also embodies a technique that can account for the value 
share of non-tradeable inputs, a bias that has plagued the Big Mac index. In contrast to 
the Big Mac index, the Apple index concludes that the RMB is not undervalued. An 
alternative explanation for the rapid growth in China’s exports is offered and we note 
that after accounting for intellectual property right (IPR) piracy, there is nothing in 
China’s overall trade balance to suggest an undervalued exchange rate. Piracy means 
that China may well be unfairly benefiting from trade, but the salient policy implication 
is better IPR enforcement, not distorting the exchange rate in a bid to compensate.  
 
JEL classifications: F31, F36 





James Laurenceson  
The School of Economics 
The University of Queensland 
Brisbane Queensland 4072 
Australia 




Kam Ki Tang* 
School of Economics 
The University of Queensland 
Brisbane Queensland 4072 
Australia 




* Corresponding author 
† The East Asia Economic Research Group was established in July 2005, providing a focal point for East 
Asia-related research of an economic nature, conducted by academic staff of the School of Economics at 
Shandong University and The University of Queensland, their research collaborators and other interested 
contributors. 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since Japan pioneered the export-led industrialization strategy in the 1950s, debates 
over equilibrium exchange rates have long provided a hotbed for economic and 
political antagonism between trading nations. In the latest example, China has been 
accused of pursuing a mercantilist development strategy by deliberately maintaining 
an undervalued Renminbi (RMB) to fuel its exports. In response, some of its major 
trading partners are erecting retaliatory trade barriers. Less than 6 months after the 
expiration of the Multifibre Agreement at the end of 2004, China has already been 
forced by the US and EU to accept new “voluntary” restraints on its textile exports. 
Pressure for revaluation and greater exchange rate flexibility has come not only from 
foreign governments but also from the International Monetary Fund (Rajan and 
Subramania 2004; Prasad and Wei 2005), the Asian Development Bank (IHT 2005) 
and other national central banks, as well as from academics such as Eichengreen 
(2004), Goldstein and Lardy (2003), Bernanke (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005) and 
Frankel (2005).  
 
In searching for equilibrium exchange rates, the main theoretical point of reference 
for economists is purchasing power parity (PPP)
1. According to PPP theory, the 
equilibrium exchange rate is the exchange rate that equalizes the price of goods across 
countries. This law of one price will hold as long as commodities are subject to 
arbitrage, and accordingly, PPP theory assumes that commodities are tradeable, 
transportation costs are zero and that there are no other barriers to trade such as tariffs. 
While there have been previous estimates of China’s equilibrium exchange rate using 
PPP as the theoretical framework (e.g., Chou and Shih 1998), a problem for these 
studies is that China has historically had high trade barriers.  However, leading up to 
World Trade Organization (WTO) entry at the end of 2001 and since this time, China 
sharply reduced its trade barriers vis-a-vis to the rest of the world (Lardy 2002). Its 
simple average tariff rate fell from 42.9 percent in 1992 to just 10.4 percent at the 
beginning of 2004 (Panitchpakdi 2004). As a result, PPP theory has become 
increasingly relevant as a framework for estimating China’s equilibrium exchange 
rate and it is in this environment that The Economist magazine’s Big Mac index has 
                                                 
1 This might be considered an unfortunate state of affairs given the mixed empirical performance of 
PPP theory in explaining observed exchange rate movements (Makin 1994).  2 
 
received revived attention. In 1986 the magazine first suggested that because of the 
Big Mac’s homogeneity and widespread availability across countries, it could serve as 
a convenient basis upon which to test the law of one price and provide rough and 
ready estimates of PPP exchange rates. According to the Big Mac index, the 
equilibrium RMB/US$ exchange rate can simply be calculated as the price of a Big 
Mac in China divided by the price of a Big Mac in the US. The latest edition of the 
index, which appeared in June 2005, showed that a Big Mac sold for RMB10.50 in 
China as compared with $3.06 in the US. Thus, the PPP exchange rate arrived at by 
the Big Mac Index was RMB3.43:US$1, which implied the actual spot rate of 
RMB8.28:US$1 was undervalued by a massive 59 percent. This was in step with the 
estimates of 57 percent undervaluation in May 2004 and 56 percent in April 2003, 
respectively. The Big Mac index has thus served to fuel complaints from lobby groups 
abroad, such as the China Currency Coalition in the US, that China’s rapid export 
growth is the result of an undervalued exchange rate. 
 
The Economist readily admits that its index is a flawed (but fun and easy) measure of 
PPP. Perhaps the most serious limitation of the index is that the majority of a Big 
Mac’s value is made up of non-tradeable inputs that are not subject to arbitrage (e.g., 
labor, rent and utilities). As Yang (2004) as demonstrated because these non-traded 
goods tend to be cheaper in lower income countries by virtue of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, the Big Mac index will be biased toward concluding that the 
currencies of lower income countries are undervalued. Yang (2004) regresses the 
valuation implied by the Big Mac index against per capita income (as a share of US 
per capita income) in 28 countries and reports that the coefficient to per capita income 
is positive (0.5248) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In an attempt to 
account for the impact of non-tradeable inputs, efforts have been put into measuring 
the share of non-tradeable inputs in the total value of a Big Mac. These estimates have 
ranged from 55 percent (Parsley and Wei 2003) to 75 percent (Yang 2004) to 97 
percent (Ong 1997), with such a range of estimates illustrating the difficulties in 
imputing the cost of non-tradeable inputs. A large part of the difficulty is that the 
costs of non-tradeable inputs are shared between Big Macs and all other products sold 
in the same fast food restaurant. How to ascribe the appropriate share of those non-
tradeable inputs to a particular product, in this case the Big Mac, is problematic. The 3 
 
problem of non-tradeable inputs also cannot be solved simply by choosing a broader 
basket of goods upon which to base PPP calculations on. Funke and Rahn (2005) 
show that even when PPP exchange rates are calculated using the World Bank’s 
International Comparison Program there continues to be a strong correlation between 
the implied valuation and income per capita.   
 
In section two of this paper we propose that the McDonald’s Big Mac should make 
way for a very different class of product – high tech consumer products such as 
computers, MP3 players and the like. Specifically, we suggest using the highly 
standardized products from Apple Inc. such as the iMac, eMac and iPod. Like the Big 
Mac, these products also satisfy the criteria of homogeneity and widespread 
availability across countries. In contrast to the Big Mac however, most of their value 
is made up of tradeable inputs and other price distortions such as tariffs and taxes can 
readily be accounted for. To be sure, even Apple products have some non-tradeable 
component. To that end, another novelity of this paper is a new method to control is 
proposed in section three to control for non-tradeable inputs in order to avoid bias in 
our results. In section four our Apple Index is presented and a test of the index’s 
performance is undertaken by considering whether the implied PPP exchange rates 
amongst European Monetary Union (EMU) members are close to one as would be 
expected. We also test for any evidence in our results of bias due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. The results of both robustness tests are extremely encouraging. In 
contrast to the Big Mac index, the Apple index concludes that the RMB is not 
undervalued. The challenge then is to provide an alternative explanation for the rapid 
growth in China’s exports (and not so large trade surpluses) and this is undertaken in 
section five. One issue we believe to be important but that has been overlooked in the 
existing literature is the connection between intellectual property right (IPR) 
violations and the trade balance. The widespread practice of IPR piracy means that 
China has been able to avoid paying the full cost associated with it imports of capital 
intensive goods and services. If the value of piracy is accounted for, China’s modest 
trade surplus disappears almost entirely. Piracy means that China is indeed unfairly 
benefiting from trade but the salient policy implication lies in better IPR enforcement, 
not in distorting the exchange rate in a bid to compensate. Section six concludes. 
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2.  WHY AN APPLE INDEX? 
There are numerous theoretical reasons why high tech consumer products are superior 
to the Big Mac in providing a basis for estimating PPP exchange rates. There are also 
good reasons why Apple products might exhibit distinct advantages over the high tech 
consumer products of other brands. 
 
Firstly, Apple products are highly homogenous, perhaps even more so than Big Macs. 
The Big Mac sold in Islamic countries use halal beef, while that sold in Israel has no 
cheese (Pakko and Pollard 2003). Similarly, we found that the range of Dell computer 
products sold in China and in the US is quite different; and even if the same model is 
available in both countries, the specifications may not be the same. On the contrary, 
Apple computers have identical specifications wherever they are sold.
2  
 
Secondly, tradeable inputs make up the bulk of a high tech consumer product’s value 
and while the supply of such inputs may come from many countries, the production of 
each input and the assembly work is highly concentrated due to economies of scale. 
For instance, Apple purchased all the flash memory chips for iPod Shuffle and iPod 
Mini from South Korea’s Samsung and it has been reported that $144 out of a $250 
iPod Nano is spent on memory, the remaining inputs costing just $30 (Business Week 
2005). As a result, the cost structure of these types of products sold in different 
countries should be largely identical, with the residual difference coming from 
differences in transportation costs, tariffs and taxes on the final products, and non-
tradeable inputs such as local sales and services staff and advertisement costs. By 
comparison, the ingredients that go into producing a Big Mac may be purchased 
domestically or imported from other countries, and more importantly, the situation 
varies from country to country. 
 
Thirdly, in contrast to agricultural products, computer products are rarely subject to 
protection. This is presumably because most governments consider them as essential 
capital goods for either production or education and their use is thought to produce 
positive productivity spillovers throughout the economy (Hearn and Mandeville 
                                                 
2 For a given model, say the iMac, consumers can choose different screen sizes, memory chip size, and 
hard drive. However, the choices are identical and available in all countries. 5 
 
2005). And even when a tariff is applied to imported high tech consumer products, the 
amount is readily known
3 and so can be accounted for. The problem in working out 
the amount of tariff embodied in a Big Mac is not only that different countries import 
different ingredients, but also that the tariffs are likely to vary across ingredients and 
across countries.  
 
Fourthly, the size of domestic taxes is clearly indicated on the product website of 
Apple Inc. and so these factors can easily be easily controlled for. 
 
Fifthly, because high tech consumer products are widely available across the internet, 
there is limited opportunity for a producer to practice price discrimination within a 
country. In comparison, the same Big Mac can be sold for different prices at different 
cities within the same country.   
 
Lastly, even if tradeable inputs make up the bulk of a product’s value and we could 
perfectly account for the non-tradeable component (see section 3), and if we could 
also account for price distortions that result from tariffs and taxes, one wildcard would 
remain. In a monopolistically competitive market, whether it is in the business of 
producing hamburgers or high tech consumer products, a profit maximising firm will 
set the final mark-up of a differentiated product according to the price elasticity of 
demand. The price elasticity of demand will in turn depend upon consumer 
preferences (i.e., the perceived availability of substitutes) and income levels, and 
these may differ from country to country. Here we believe that basing equilibrium 
exchange rate calculations on Apple products may be preferable to other brands in 
that Apple’s consumers are well known, albeit primarily anecdotally, for their brand 
loyalty (Business Week 2004) and this loyalty appears to extend to China (Liu 2005). 
To the extent that this is true, an implication of this brand loyalty is that demand for 
Apple products would be relatively less price sensitive, and so while their mark ups 
might still vary somewhat country to country, they will be relatively stable compared 
with other brands. With respect to the impact that cross country differences in income 
levels would have on the price elasticity of demand, a couple observations are 
                                                 
3 See the international tariff database of the Office of Technology and Electronic Commerce, USA at: 
http://www.export.gov/.  6 
 
relevant. For one, the difference in income levels of high tech product consumers 
across countries is likely to be much smaller than the difference in average per capita 
income levels. Therefore, the tendency to charge a lower mark-up in a lower income 
country such as China compared with the US may not be as great as first thought. 
Secondly, as we will later show, relaxing the assumption on uniform cross-country 
mark-up rates, only serves to reinforce our conclusion regarding the RMB’s valuation.  
 
3.  ACCOUNTING FOR NON-TRADEABLE INPUTS 
A distinct advantage of using Apple products to calculate PPP exchange rates is that 
the bulk of their value is made up of tradeable components. However, even Apple 
products have a non-tradeable component that should be accounted for in order to 
derive unbiased PPP estimates. In this section we outline the methodology we use to 
account for the non-tradeable share.  
 
It is customary to consider the production cost of a good as a sum of the costs of 
tradeable and non-tradeable inputs, respectively. However, in many cases, the non-
tradeable input is a fixed input (in the short run) in the production of a whole range of 
outputs. For instance, the cost of renting a shop is fixed regardless how many Big 
Mac’s or iMac’s are sold; workers in McDonald restaurants need to serve Big Macs as 
well as coffee to customers, and sale persons in Apple Centres need to answer 
enquiries regarding the iMac as well as the iPod. Therefore, it is not easy to ascribe 
the appropriate share of the fixed cost to a particular product. However, the cost 
associated with non-tradeable inputs can be controlled for through making some 
simple and plausible assumptions. 
 
Consider a number of product models, each with a few very similar varieties, and all 
of which are sold around the world. For instance, a product model could be an iPod or 
eMac; for an iPod, the two varieties are 20GB and 60GB, and for an eMac, the two 
varieties are Combo drive and Super drive. For each product model, suppose the local 
currency price of variety  ( 1,2... ) j jJ =  sold in country  ( 1,2... ) kk K =  is presented 
by 
j
k P , and it can be expressed as a combination of a number of factors: 
  ( )
jj j j
kk kk PT X N Y φ =+  (1) 7 
 
where  k T  and  k N  are the unit costs of tradeable and non-tradeable inputs, 
respectively, expressed in the domestic currency; 
j X  and 
j Y  are the amounts of 
tradeable and non-tradeable inputs used in the product, respectively; and 
k
j φ  is the rate 
of mark-up on the product. 
 
If the law of one price is applied to the tradeable input, the PPP exchange rate 















k P  is directly observable and the system is under-identified. To 
identify  ,1 kk e + , we need to impose a number of assumptions, which we consider to be 
realistic with respect to the market situation for Apple products. 
 
Firstly, as we are considering very similar product varieties, we assume the mark-up 
rates to be the same across them (i.e. 
j
kk φ φ = ). As an example, we assume the mark-
up rate on an iPod 20GB will be the same as that on an iPod 60GB in a country. 
 
Secondly, if all product varieties sold in a country share the fixed local operational 
cost, 
j Y  will be equal to 
1 j Y
+  for all j, and we can further normalize it to one without 
losing any generality. Here what we are assuming is that the cost share of non-
tradeable inputs is constant for all varieties of a product model. Again, as an example, 
we are assuming that the share of non-tradeable inputs will be the same for an iPod 
20GB as an iPod 60GB. This assumption, while not necessarily holding for different 
products, is reasonable for products of only small variations. 
 
Incorporating these two assumptions into equation (1) for two products, j and  1 j + , 
we can write 
  ( )
11 jj j j
kk k k PP T XX φ
++ −= −  (3) 
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The exchange rate is identifiable only if we impose the third, and perhaps the most 
controversial assumption; that the mark-ups rates are the same across countries, i.e. 
1 kk φ φ + = . As discussed in the preceding section, here is where we believe that 
choosing Apple products might have certain advantages. In any case, the empirical 
implication of Apple Inc. possibly varying the mark-up according to a country’s 
income level will be shown in the following section. 
 




















By using the price difference of two varieties of the same product model, essentially 
we extract the price information of the additional tradeable input of the more 
expensive variety of the model, such as the price of the additional 40GB memory 
inside a 60GB iPod, and use the price of this additional tradeable input to calculate the 
PPP exchange rate. 
 
One may query that if the above procedure can handle non-tradeable inputs, why we 
do not apply it to the Big Mac and other McDonalds’ hamburgers? The reason is that 
with products that have a large non-tradeable input, a small violation of the 
assumptions underlining the method could lead to substantial errors in the imputed 
equilibrium exchange rate. Therefore, applying the procedure to products with a 
relatively small proportion of non-tradeable input will reduce the potential effects of 
such errors.  
 
In this study, we include five Apple product models, with two to three varieties for 
each: iPod nano (2GB and 4GB), iPod (20GB and 60GB), eMac (Combo drive and 
Super drive), iMac (17-inch, 1.8GHz; 17-inch, 2 GHz; and 20-inch, 2GHz), and 9 
 
PowerMac (2GHz, 2.3GHz, and 2.7 GHz). We use multiple product models so that 
we can average out the effect of any peculiar pricing elements associated with a 
particular product that are not captured by our model. Data were downloaded from the 
Apple Inc. website in November, 2005. There are 24 countries in our sample, 
including nine Euro zone members. Besides China, there is only one other developing 
country in our sample, India. 
 
Table 1 lists the prices of all the product models and their varieties at domestic 
currencies. The prices include import tariffs and domestic taxes, and these rates are 
shown in the table as well. The amount of tariffs and taxes will be taken out in the 
exchange rate computation process. Before moving on to discuss the results it can be 
seen from Table 1 that in the Euro area prices can sometimes vary substantially across 
countries, even after accounting for differences in tax rates. This may well be due to 
differences in mark-ups across countries. In other words, despite all the arguments in 
favour of using Apple products, we still need to be aware of the possible errors arising 
from a violation of the assumption of a uniform mark-up across countries. 10 
Table 1 Products price in domestic currency and the domestic tax rate 
Country  Domestic 
tax (%)
a  iPod nano  iPod  eMac  iMac  PowerMac 
















US  0  199 249 299 399 799  999  1299 1499 1799 1999 2488 2999 
Australia  10  299 359 449 598  1299  1499 1999 2299 2795 3199 3999 4899 
China  0  1900 2400 2900 3900 8620 10620 13900 15900 18900 20900 25900 30900 
Canada  0  249 299 379 519 999 1249 1599 1849 2199 2499 3149 3799 
Denmark  25  1599 1999 2399 3449 6199  7799  9999  11499 13999 15499 18999 22999 
Hong  Kong  0  1550 1900 2400 3200 6200  7800  10300 11900 14200 15900 19900 23900 
India 0  n.a.  n.a.  20700  29000 53200  62600  78400  87100  105500 136200 162500 189600 
Japan  5  21800 27800 32800 45800 94290 115290 152040 173040 209790 236040 293790 351540 
Norway  25  1790 2190 2790 3690 6990  8790  11290 12990 15790 17490 21490 25990 
Singapore  0  348 438 528 728  1488  1788 2388 2688 3288 3688 4588 5488 
South  Korea  10  230000 290000 350000 470000 950000 1190000 1490000 1790000 2090000 2490000 3090000 3690000 
Sweden  25  1995 2495 2995 4295 7495  9295  11995 13995 16995 18495 22995 27495 
Switzerland  7.5  289 369 439 599  1099  1399 1799  2049.01  2499 2699 3399 4049 
Taiwan  5  6900 8600  10500  13900  28900  35900 45900 53900 62900 74900 92900  108900 
UK  17  139 179 209 299 549  679  899  999  1199.01  1349.01  1699 1999 
Euro                       
Austria  20  209 259 309 449 799  999  1299 1499 1799 1979 2479 2969 
Belgium  21  209 259 319  448.99  799 1019 1319 1519 1829 1999 2499 2999 
Finland  22  209 269  319.01  449 819  1019.01  1328.99  1529 1849 2019 2519 3019 
France  20  239 319 329 469 799  998.99  1299  1498.99  1799 1979 2469 2959 
Germany  16  199  249.01  299 429 779  979.01  1269.01  1469 1759 1919 2399 2879 
R.  Ireland  20  209 259 319  448.99  799  999  1319 1529 1829 1999 2499 2999 
Italy  20  209 269 319 459 799  999  1299 1499 1799 1979 2479 2969 
Netherlands  20  209 259 309 439  789.01  999.01  1299 1499  1798.99  1969 2459 2949 
Spain  16  199  249.01  299 429 769  968.99  1269.01  1459 1749 1919 2389 2869 
Notes: (a) Domestic taxes include goods and services tax (GST) or value-added tax (VAT). The tax rates are obtained from Apple Inc.’s product website, except that the tax 
rates of South Korea and Taiwan are obtained from the US Office of Technology and Electronic Commerce. 11 
4.  RESULTS 
In Table 2, we present two different versions of the Apple index. The main Apple 
index is the one described above that contains an adjustment for non-tradeable inputs. 
For this index we first calculate PPP exchange rates based on the price differential 
(after accounting for tariffs and taxes) between different varieties of the same product 
model (column 3 – 9). We then take an average across the product models to arrive at 
our final index in column 10. Column 11 shows the actual spot exchange rate drawn 
from Reuters on September 26 and October 12, 2005. The figures for both days are 
very close, eliminating the chance of obtaining data from a particular volatile trading 
day. The valuation implied by comparing the main Apple index with the spot rate is 
found in column 12. Take Canada as an example; the main Apple index indicates that 
one US$ should buy 1.24 Canadian dollars, while the spot rate on the foreign 
exchange market is only 1.17 Canadian dollars per US$. Therefore, the Canadian 
dollar is overvalued by 100*(1.24 1.17)/1.24 −  = 5.36 percent. We then supplement 
the main Apple index with a more basic version that does not include the adjustment 
for non-tradeable inputs. This basic Apple index is included for a couple of reasons. 
For one, the basic index is the technical equivalent of the Big Mac index in that it 
calculates PPP exchange rates simply by comparing the local currency prices (also 
after accounting for tariffs and taxes) of the various product varieties and taking an 
average across the products. In this way it is interesting to compare the Big Mac index 
with the Apple equivalent. Also, because Apple products only have a relatively small 
non-tradeable component to begin with, it may be that going through the procedure 
for adjusting for non-tradeable inputs does not materially change the results anyway. 
The valuation implied by comparing the basic Apple index with the spot rate is 
presented in column 13. Finally, for comparison purposes, the valuation implied by 
the latest Big Mac index is presented in column 14.  
 12 
Table 2. PPP exchange rates implied by the Apple index 





(Sept 26; Oct 
12, 2005) 
Overvalue (+) / Undervalue (-) 
   iPod 
nano  iPod eMac  iMac  PowerMac     
Main Apple 






index   
(June 2005) 
















GHz - Dural 
2.3 GHz 
      
US  US  dollar  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  0  0  0 
Australia  Australian 
dollar  1.08  1.34 0.90  1.35  1.49 1.47 1.59  1.32 1.32  -0.52 5.77  -18 
China RMB  10.00  10.00  10.00  10.00 10.00  10.22 9.78  10.00 8.09  19.12 21.12  -59 
Canada  Canadian 
dollar  1.00  1.40 1.25  1.25  1.17 1.33 1.27  1.24 1.17  5.36 6.19  -14 
Denmark  Danish  Krone  6.00  7.88 6.00  5.63  6.25 5.37 5.87  6.14 6.21  -1.12 1.43  50 
Hong Kong  HK dollar  7.00  8.00  8.00  8.00  7.67  8.18  7.83  7.81  7.76  0.67  1.71  -50 
India  India  rupee  n.a.  67.23 38.07  35.24  49.68 43.56 42.96  46.12 44.35  3.85  15.11  n.a. 
Japan  yen  114.00  123.50 99.75  99.75  116.38 112.19 107.36  110.42 113.44  -2.73  -3.45  -23 
Norway  Norwegian 
Krone  6.00  6.75 6.75  6.38  7.00 6.13 6.60  6.52 6.51  0.17 8.03  98 
Singapore  Singapore 
dollar  1.80  2.00 1.50  1.50  2.00 1.84 1.76  1.77 1.69  4.59 6.65  -29 
South  Korea  Won  1080.00  1080.00 1080.00  1350.00  900.00  1104.29 1056.75  1093.01 1038.60  4.98  3.93  -19 
Sweden  Swedish  Krona  7.50  9.75 6.75  7.50  7.50 6.90 6.60  7.50 7.78  -3.75 -1.34  36 
Switzerland  Swiss  Franc  1.48  1.48 1.39  1.16  1.39 1.32 1.18  1.34 1.29  3.65 1.25  65 
Taiwan NT  dollar  32.30  32.30 33.25  38.00  28.50 34.97 29.75  32.72 33.31  -1.78  2.09  -21 
UK  Pound  0.66  0.75 0.54  0.42  0.55 0.59 0.49  0.57 0.57  0.61 3.72  12 
Austria  Euro  0.80  1.12 0.80  0.80  0.80 0.82 0.77  0.84 0.83  1.35 1.98  n.a. 
Belgium  Euro  0.79  1.03 0.87  0.79  0.82 0.81 0.77  0.84 0.83  0.81 2.18  n.a. 
Finland  Euro  0.94  1.01 0.78  0.78  0.83 0.80 0.76  0.84 0.83  1.31 2.28  n.a. 
France  Euro  1.28  1.12 0.80  0.80  0.80 0.80 0.77  0.91 0.83  8.53 5.84  n.a. 
Germany  Euro  0.84  1.09 0.84  0.84  0.81 0.82 0.79  0.86 0.83  3.52 2.24  n.a. 
Ireland  Euro  0.80  1.04 0.80  0.84  0.80 0.82 0.78  0.84 0.83  0.94 2.88  n.a. 
Italy  Euro  0.96  1.12 0.80  0.80  0.80 0.82 0.77  0.87 0.83  3.95 2.76  n.a. 
Netherlands  Euro  0.80  1.04 0.84  0.80  0.80 0.80 0.77  0.84 0.83  0.40 1.52  n.a. 
Spain Euro  0.84  1.09 0.84  0.80  0.81 0.81 0.79  0.85 0.83  2.56 1.89  n.a. 
All Euro 
countries  Euro               0.85  0.83  2.66  2.63  17 
Notes: The figures for “All Euro countries” are calculated as the arithmetic mean of the figures of the Euro countries in the sample. 13 
 
Columns 3 to 9 show that the PPP exchange rates implied by each product model can 
vary significantly for some countries. For instance, the PPP exchange rate implied by 
the iPod nano for the Australian dollar is A$1.08:US$1, and the PPP exchange rate 
implied by other product models varies from A$0.90 to A$1.59 per US$. Such 
variations are the reason we take an average value to arrive at our final index. For 
some countries however the range is very small to begin with. For example, the range 
of PPP exchange rates calculated for China only varies between RMB9.78 and 
RMB10.22 per US$.  
 
It is clear from Table 2 that the level, and in many cases, even the direction of 
valuation implied by the Apple index and Big Mac index are in great contrast. In 
general, the amount of deviation from equilibrium implied by the Apple index is 
much smaller, mostly just a few percentage points. On the contrary, the amount of 
deviation implied by the Big Mac index is over 10 times larger. For instance, even for 
a heavily traded international currency like Swiss Franc, the Big Mac index suggests 
that foreign exchange markets have it overvalued by a massive 65 percent, compared 
to the 3.7 percent suggested by the Apple index. In this respect, we believe the Apple 
index to be more intuitively appealing. It is also interesting to note that there is little 
variation between the main Apple index and its more basic version. The largest 
difference is for India, where the main index implies the Rupee was overvalued by 
3.85 percent while the basic index has it overvalued by 15.11 percent. The general 
agreement between the main and basic Apple Index is not surprising since we know 
that non-tradeable goods only account for a small value share of Apple products. In 
the rest of the discussion, we focus only on the main Apple index. 
 
To further evaluate the robustness of the Apple index we perform two tests. Firstly, 
the Euro provides us with an absolute benchmark to measure the performance of the 
Apple index as the PPP exchange rates between any Euro countries should be equal to 
one. As it can be seen from Table 2, the PPP exchange rates implied by the Apple 
index for the nine Euro countries vary narrowly between 0.84 and 0.91. More 
specifically, the coefficient of variation (i.e. the standard deviation divided by the 
mean) is equal to only 0.027. Thus, the Apple index passes this first test convincingly. 
Since  The Economist does not publish the Big Mac index for individual Euro 14 
 
countries, a direct comparison of the two indexes using this measure of robustness 
cannot be performed. A second robustness test that makes use of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect however can provide a platform for direct comparison between the 
two indexes. It was discussed earlier that if a product has a non-tradeable component 
that is not accounted for, the implied PPP exchange rate will tend to be biased toward 
concluding that the currencies of lower income countries are undervalued while the 
currencies of higher income countries are overvalued. This be smaller if the share of 
non-tradeables is small or is adjusted for. To test whether this bias is present in our 
Apple index, we plot in Figure 1 the valuations implied by the main Apple index and 
the Big Mac index against per capita income (expressed as a share of US per capita 
income). 
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Note: Source of GDP per capita is obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. 
 
As it can be seen from Figure 1, and as has already been pointed out by Yang (2004), 
for the Big Mac index there is a recognizable positive relation between valuation and 
income per capita. The pattern for the Apple index is strikingly different in that its 
implied valuation is entirely unrelated to income per capita. Thus, based on the 
theoretical arguments outlined in section two and the above robustness tests, we have 
considerable confidence in the results implied by the Apple index and certainly 
consider it superior to the Big Mac index.  
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Turning now to the Chinese currency debate, perhaps the most striking conclusion of 
the Apple index is that the equilibrium price of the Chinese currency is 
RMB10:US$1. As mentioned previously, the PPP exchange rates implied by various 
Apple product models and varieties are very similar, with five out of seven PPP 
exchange rates being equal to this rate of exchange. Compared to the spot rate of 
RMB8.09:US$1, the findings imply that the RMB is overvalued by 19 percent. This 
result is the opposite of the standard view, which considers that China has been 
deliberately maintaining an undervalued exchange rate to fuel export growth. Further 
recall that an assumption in constructing the Apple index is that for a product model, 
the mark-up is uniform across model varieties and across countries. One may argue 
that given the fact that income per capita in China is only a fraction that of the US,
4 
Apple Inc. might price their products at a lower mark-up in China than in the US. If 
the mark-up rate in China is lower, we know that the bias in the calculated exchange 
rate would be towards implying undervaluation. That is, if this type of market 
discrimination pricing policy did exist, then the ‘true’ PPP exchange rate of the RMB 
would be even higher, and the RMB would be overvalued by even more than 19 
percent! Alternatively we could say that for the RMB spot rate to be undervalued, the 
rate of mark-up would have to be at least 20 percent higher in China than in the US. 
As this is a very unlikely scenario, the conclusion that the RMB is not undervalued is 
robust to relaxing the assumption of a uniform mark-up across countries.  
 
5.  THE TRADE BALANCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS  
If the rapid growth in China’s exports cannot be attributed to an undervalued 
exchange rate, how then might it be explained? Our view is that there are two primary 
reasons, quite apart from the value of the exchange rate, that have contributed to rapid 
export growth in China.  
 
The first is simply that China began its export expansion from a very low and 
distorted base. In spite of having an unrivalled comparative advantage in the 
production of labor-intensive goods, China was a latecomer to export-orientated 
industrialization. Several decades of autarky meant that when the open-door policy 
                                                 
4 According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, in 2005, China’s GDP per capita is equal 
to three percent that of the US if evaluated at current prices, and is equal to 14 percent if evaluated at 
PPP prices. 16 
 
was adopted in 1979, the scope to increase its exports was massive. China’s share of 
world exports in the late 1970s was just 1 percent, an absurdly low figure given the 
size of its economy and comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive 
manufactures. Even after two and half decades of rapid export growth, the level of 
China’s exports is still less than what the size of its economy would imply. By 2004, 
China’s share of world exports had risen to 6.7 percent. The combined trade share of 
Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand meanwhile was 9.7 
percent, despite the fact that their combined GDP was less than that of China’s. 
Japan’s export share, post-WW2, kept growing until it peaked at 10 percent in the 
early 1990s.   
 
The second reason for the rapid growth in Chinese exports is that not only are 
domestic firms exploiting the country’s comparative advantage, foreign firms are also 
recycling their comparative advantage through China. Neighbouring economies such 
as Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan began their industrialization drives several decades 
before China also focusing on the export of labor-intensive manufactures. Over time, 
as labor costs in these countries have risen, their manufacturing firms have used 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in China as a means of maintaining their 
competitiveness. Firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan have been most aggressively 
pursuing this approach. This recycling of comparative advantage means that the 
majority of China’s exports are in fact “foreign-owned”. In 1981, exports from 
foreign-invested enterprises accounted for only 0.1 percent of China’s total exports. 
By 2004, their share had reached nearly 60 percent. If we subtract the exports of 
foreign-invested enterprises, the growth rate of China’s exports slows appreciably. 
We think that part of the problem here is one of perception in that China’s FDI-led 
export growth is on a scale not previously seen. It is also in stark contrast to Japan’s 
earlier growth spurt in which foreign investment played a negligible role
5.  
 
The view that an undervalued exchange rate has been driving China’s export growth 
further loses currency when China’s broader trade data is considered, such as the rate 
                                                 
5 It is true that in some sectors such as automobile production, Japanese firms were initially encouraged 
to form technical tie ups with foreign firms. This however was a temporary affair and Japanese firms 
were pushed to quickly acquire the necessary technology and increase the local content of their 
production.  17 
 
of growth in imports and its overall trade balance.  An undervalued exchange rate 
would promote exports while at the same time restrain imports, with the end result 
being large trade surpluses. In contrast, China’s goods and services trade balance 
during 2000 – 2004 remained stable within the modest range of 2.39 - 2.95 percent of 
GDP. Enright (2005) points out that Japan, Russia, Germany, Canada, Ireland and 
Norway all run higher trade surpluses as a share of GDP than China. China continues 
to heavily import final goods and services and intermediate inputs that make intensive 
use of capital (physical and human). Foreign firms have primarily only been 
relocating labor intensive stages of production to China and because China’s exports 
have a high imported component, the domestic value added input has been estimated 
to be only around 20 percent (Enright 2005). By way of comparison, Sung (2000) 
found that the rate of value-added in exports from Hong Kong was 100 percent higher 
than exports from the mainland.   
 
Another important issue that has received little attention in the literature to date is the 
impact of intellectual property right (IPR) violations on China’s trade balance. Based 
on comparative advantage, it is expected that China will be a net exporter of labor- 
intensive products and a net importer of capital-intensive products, and this, in the 
main, is what is observed. A distinct advantage that accrues to China based on this 
comparative advantage is that because the technology embodied in its imports of 
capital-intensive goods is sometimes easily misappropriated, it has effectively not 
been required to pay the full cost of these imports. In 2004, a senior US government 
trade official claimed that Chinese piracy of US products extended from DVDs to 
pharmaceuticals to golf clubs to car parts (Asia Times 2004). The total cost to US 
companies of such piracy was put at between $US20-24 billion a year. If the losses 
incurred by European and Japanese companies are included, the figure jumps to in 
excess of US$50 billion. In 2004, China’s trade surplus was equal to US$49 billion. In 
other words, if IPR violations were halted, China’s modest trade surplus would 
disappear almost entirely. Piracy means that China may indeed be unfairly benefiting 
in trade but there is nothing in the overall balance of trade to suggest an undervalued 
exchange rate. Further, the salient policy implication is that more attention needs to be 
given to IPR enforcement, not distorting the exchange rate in an attempt to 
compensate.  18 
 
 
Only in the first quarter of 2005 did the growth rate of China’s exports sharply 
outpace that of its imports. At the end of 2004, the year-on-year increase in exports 
and imports was 35.4 percent and 36 percent respectively. Whereas export growth 
held this rapid rate of increase (34.9 percent) through the first quarter of 2005, import 
growth slowed markedly (12.2 percent). By the third quarter, export growth has 
slowed somewhat (31.3 percent) and import growth had picked up (16.0 percent). 
Whether the differential pace of export and import growth in 2005 serves as evidence 
that China has begun moving up the value chain and that the trade balance will grow 
in the future is too early to say. Similar spikes have been observed in the past and 
proved to only be short run events. For example, at the end of 2002, the annualized 
rate of growth in exports and imports was 21.3 percent and 22.3 percent respectively. 
Yet in January 2003, import growth shot up to 63.4 percent, while exports also grew 
but far less dramatically to 37.3 percent. By the start of 2004, exports and imports 
were again growing at roughly the same rate. Whether the events of 2005 prove 
similarly momentary or are of a longer run in nature, some context needs to be 
brought to bear. 
 
Firstly, to some extent, China experiencing a trade surplus is an expected outcome of 
a natural adjustment process as the world absorbs a massive amount of previously 
under-utilized labor. This under-utilized labor stock comes not only from China but to 
a lesser extent also from India, Eastern Europe and other emerging economies. There 
is an unavoidable lag that results from first having to mobilize this surplus labor 
through exports and other domestic sources of demand before they can become 
consumers with income levels sufficient to start demanding imports. Fu and 
Balasubramanyam (2005) advance a similar argument that exports provide a vent for 
the surplus productive capacity that occurs in developing countries such as China 
resulting from a disproportion between production and consumption capacities. Thus, 
in the short run, there is almost no other way out except to see the exports from these 
countries rise and this will have the effect of bringing world prices of labor-intensive 
products to a new and lower equilibrium level. To put it another way, if the RMB’s 
value is pushed up in order to stem what some regard as excessive exports, it is in fact 
a manipulation of the exchange rate that intends to decelerate a necessary adjustment 19 
 
process. Over time, average incomes in China will increase to the extent that more 
consumers can afford BMW cars from Germany, Harley Davidson motorcycles from 
the US and education services from Australia. Given the size of the future pool of 
consumers, the increase in imports will in some cases be dramatic. The Australian 
higher education market is a good example. In 2000, there were 4387 Chinese 
students, almost entirely full fee paying, studying in Australian universities. By 2004 
that number had skyrocketed to 37106.
6 
 
Secondly, while the local sourcing of inputs and the transfer of higher-end stages of 
production to China would have the effect of increasing China’s trade surplus, there 
are other mitigating factors that will come into play. Most obviously, as China itself 
increasingly produces goods and services that makes intensive use of physical and 
human capital, it can be expected that IPR enforcement in the country will receive a 
boost. This will have the flow on effect of raising the amount that China will have to 
spend in order to import capital-intensive goods and services from other countries.  
 
Finally, as Enright (2005) points out, we should not lose sight of the fact that China’s 
export profile is presently skewed towards those highly visible sectors in which it is 
prodigiously competitive such as the manufacture of garments and labor-intensive 
consumer goods. In many of its other industries meanwhile, it remains far from being 
internationally uncompetitive and there is little reason to expect this will change in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
There are few topics in international economics that are presently more debated than 
the equilibrium value of China’s exchange rate. One of the most popular measures of 
equilibrium exchange rates, the Big Mac index, has fuelled discontent abroad in 
suggesting that the RMB is a seriously undervalued currency. Yet previous studies 
have already pointed out the numerous limitations of the Big Max index; in particular, 
the bias resulting from failing to account for non-tradeable inputs. In this paper we 
extend the literature by offering a new and theoretically more appealing index of 
                                                 
6 The statistics are sourced from the Department of Education, Science and Training, Australia 
Commonwealth Government. 20 
 
equilibrium exchange rates based on the high tech consumer products sold by Apple 
Inc. Our Apple index also embodies a technique that can account for the value share 
of non-tradeable inputs. While we only apply this method to Apple products in this 
paper, it can in principle also be applied to other products that satisfy the underlining 
assumptions. The Apple index performs strongly in tests of robustness. Perhaps the 
most striking finding of the Apple index is that the RMB is not undervalued. This then 
presents the challenge of explaining the rapid growth rate of China’s exports without 
resorting to claims of currency undervaluation. We believe the answer lies primarily 
in the fact that China’s exports are growing from an extremely low and highly 
distorted base and because other countries are also recycling their comparative 
advantage in the production and export of labor-intensive manufactures through 
China. We also note that there is nothing in China’s overall trade balance to suggest 
an undervalued exchange rate. Firstly, while China’s exports have grown rapidly, so 
to have its imports such that the country’s overall balance of trade through 2004 was 
only moderately in surplus. Secondly, because of the nature of China’s comparative 
advantage, it imports capital-intensive goods and services that are sometimes 
vulnerable to IPR piracy. This means that China does not have to pay the full cost 
associated with its imports and once an adjustment is made for the cost of piracy, 
China’s modest trade surplus disappears almost entirely. In this way China does 
indeed unfairly benefit from trade but it has nothing to do with the value of its 
exchange rate. The salient policy implication lies in better IPR enforcement, not 
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